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ABSTRACT
Parties negotiating an arm’s length contract are generally not required to
disclose facts to one another. Although this default rule is supported by both
centuries of common law and freedom of contract principles, courts and
legislatures treat certain transactions differently. This is particularly true in
circumstances in which the default rule results in an unacceptable harm suffered by
a broad group of persons. In such cases, lawmakers have acted to impose
precontractual disclosure obligations. These decisions and statutes are largely
reactive: a harm is identified in a certain transaction’s precontractual period and
disclosure is mandated to rectify the harm. These reactive measures, although
helpful, are insufficient in some instances. Large scale economic calamities are
often caused by information asymmetries in individual contracts. This was true in
the Great Depression (unregulated contracts for sales of stock) and the Great
Recession (unregulated contracts for sales of mortgage-backed securities).
This article proposes an analytical tool to prospectively identify such
transactions. This tool, the Disclosure Framework, provides lawmakers a means of
identifying circumstances in which it is appropriate to mandate precontractual
disclosure. To accomplish this task, the Disclosure Framework directs lawmakers
to identify the information asymmetry in a transaction and balance the respective
harms of either disclosure or nondisclosure on the affected stakeholder group.
Precontractual disclosure is a matter of compelling immediacy. Because
regulatory agencies are currently struggling with how to structure the disclosure
mandates of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the
question of when it is appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure is both
timely and important. Although designed for legislators, the Disclosure Framework
may also serve as a tool for consumer rights groups and agencies (such as the
recently established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) to help spur
legislative action. Ultimately, the Disclosure Framework provides support for the
imposition of precontractual disclosure that is both theoretically sound and
consistent with common law and statutory exceptions to the default rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Let me take you back in time. Imagine you are a high school senior.1
You have spent the previous three years getting good grades, taking
admissions tests, and writing personal statements. The hard work has paid
off, and several colleges have accepted you. You have narrowed the choice
to two, but no matter how hard you try, you cannot choose. You see no
discernible difference in reputation or academic offerings, and you would
happily live in either school’s location. In fact, the only meaningful
distinguishing factor that you can discern is tuition. One school is
significantly cheaper. However, you suspect that this difference might be
offset by living expenses; the cheaper school is in New York City, and the
more expensive school is in a small rural town.
To help make your decision, one of the schools provided a financial aid
award letter that lists a tremendous amount of information in a clear, easily
understood format. Such information includes your estimated expenses, the
amount most students borrow to attend the school, the rate of graduates that
ultimately default on their loans, and an estimated monthly loan payment.2
This is a fantastic tool, so you naturally ask the other school to provide a
similar letter. After all, you are not making this decision in a vacuum, and
you will only be able to make an informed decision if you can put the
proffered data in perspective. Unfortunately, the other school refuses to
provide the information.3
You find it disconcerting that schools expect you to sign a contract
obligating you to hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt without knowing
all the relevant information. However frustrating, for many transactions,
contract law does not prohibit the school’s behavior. Indeed, generally
speaking, as long as the school neither lies nor knowingly allows you to rely
on a falsehood,4 contract law does not view the school’s behavior as
1

If this is a bridge too far, the exercise also works if you imagine yourself a parent of a
high school senior.
2
You learn that this financial aid award letter was based upon a model letter, otherwise
known as the “Shopping Sheet,” created by a partnership between the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Department of Education to address the rising costs of education
by helping students “know before they owe.” See Richard Cordray, Director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Remarks in a Press Call with Education Secretary
Arne Duncan: Financial Aid Shopping Sheet (July 23, 2012).
3
At the time of this writing, the Shopping Sheet is largely voluntary for schools. To date,
ten schools have pledged to use the Shopping Sheet. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Obama Administration and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Partner to
Promote Transparency in College Costs (July 24, 2012).
4
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981); see also infra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text.
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inappropriate.5 However, absent clear violations such as fraud or
misrepresentation, how should parties conduct themselves before a contract
is executed? Is passive honesty enough, or do we owe positive disclosure
obligations to our contracting counterparts? More to the point, when is it
appropriate to impose a duty to disclose material facts upon parties
contemplating a contractual relationship?
The general rule is that parties do not owe one another any duty of
disclosure before a contract is in place. In certain circumstances, both
common law and statutory law have deviated from this general rule.
However, these decisions and statutes are largely reactive: an inefficiency is
identified in a certain transaction’s precontractual period and disclosure is
mandated to remedy such inefficiency. These reactive measures, although
helpful, are insufficient. Ideally, lawmakers could identify such problems in
a more proactive manner, as inefficiencies in many contractual relationships
have negative effects that extend beyond the contracting parties. For
example, some have argued that the Great Recession would have been
mitigated (or avoided altogether) if the financial industry were subject to
mandates of greater disclosure.6 Therefore, it should be no surprise that
5

Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 84 (1993) (noting that “the United States
Supreme Court opined that a buyer who had exclusive information, which was about to be
made public and that would substantially affect the price of a commodity, was not required
to inform the seller as long as the buyer did nothing to deceive the seller.”); see also
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817) (noting that “[t]he question in this
case is, whether the intelligence of [material] extrinsic circumstances … which was
exclusively within the knowledge of [one party], ought to have been communicated by him
to the [other party]? The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate it.”);
Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991); Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin.
Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282-83 (2nd Cir. 1975); Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
6
Although the blame for the Great Recession may be placed upon many industries and
players, there is little doubt that predatory lending (spurred on by the securitization of
mortgages) played a major role. See Nick Carey, Racial predatory loans fueled U.S.
housing crisis: study, REUTERS, (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/04/us-usa-foreclosures-raceidUSTRE6930K520101004 (citing Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 629 (2010)
(“Predatory lending aimed at racially segregated minority neighborhoods led to mass
foreclosures that fueled the U.S. housing crisis.”)). The primary weapon to combat
predatory lending is mandated disclosures. See, e.g., About Predatory Lending, WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., (Dec. 15, 2010)
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumers/predlendwp.htm (emphasizing the importance of
disclosures in avoiding predatory lending by noting that “disclosures are required to be
provided at two major points in the mortgage transaction. If disclosures are not provided [at
these two points], do not do business with this lender or broker.”). Beyond predatory
lending, disclosures are the focus of legislation attempting to prevent future economic
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precontractual disclosure is a core component of many of the mandates of
the statute enacted to address the Great Recession, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).7
Given that regulatory agencies are currently struggling with how to
structure the disclosure mandates of the Dodd-Frank Act (especially in the
area of securities and securitization reform),8 the question of when it is
appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure is a matter of compelling
immediacy.
This article proposes an analytical framework for legislators to identify
when it is appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure. Both common
law and statutory law have established exceptions to the general rule against
precontractual disclosure. Despite the fact that these exceptions have a
narrow focus and are tailored to apply to a particular fact pattern, they share
some similarities. These similarities provide the basis to craft universallyapplicable principles, which this article uses to create the legislative
framework for establishing the appropriateness of precontractual disclosure.
This framework has two factors: an analysis of information asymmetry in
the contractual relationship at issue and the impact of the transaction on
certain stakeholders. This article calls this proposed analytical framework
the Disclosure Framework. The Disclosure Framework, properly applied,
serves as a guide for legislators considering the imposition of disclosure
requirements.
As background, Part I of this article discusses the default rule: parties to
a negotiation do not owe one another a duty of precontractual disclosure.
crises. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s
preamble states that a goal of the act is to “improve … transparency in the financial
system.” Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; see
also, Halah Touryalai, Jamie Dimon’s Testimony: Volcker Rule May Have Prevented Loss,
FORBES, Jun. 13, 2012, (noting that Jamie Dimon, chief executive and chairman of
JPMorgan Chase, “says regulators should make sure there are … proper disclosures….”). It
should be noted, however, that some commentators do not believe that mandating
disclosure helps ameliorate the targeted issues. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 PENN. L.R. 647, 653 (2011), pointing
out that mandated disclosures are often impenetrable.
7
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 1100F (amending section 615(h) of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act to require certain disclosures if a credit score is used in making the credit decision); see
also Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX, Subtitle C (requiring disclosures by credit rating agencies
which include disclosure of conflicts of interest, historical rating performance data, and
detailed rating methodologies).
8
See, e.g., Enhanced Oversight After the Financial Crisis: The Wall Street Reform Act at
One Year: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 112
Congr. (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission) (“To help fulfill its objective, the [Dodd-Frank] Act directs the SEC to write
a large number of rules necessary to implement the Act [including] more than 90
mandatory rulemaking provisions.”).
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This section also explores the theoretical justification for the default rule,
freedom of contract, before addressing how certain information
asymmetries present problems for the default rule. Part II proposes and
describes the two factors of the Disclosure Framework: the analysis of
information asymmetry in the contractual relationship at issue and an
analysis of the stakeholder interest in imposing precontractual disclosure in
the target transaction. Part III discusses both common law and statutory
exceptions to the default rule against precontractual disclosure, drawing
parallels between these exceptions and revealing how these parallels are
reflected in the Disclosure Framework’s two factors. Part IV illustrates the
application of the Disclosure Framework by analyzing the hypothetical
described at this article’s outset and discusses whether the Disclosure
Framework analysis recommends precontractual disclosure in the student
loan context.
I. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT9
Before discussing the Disclosure Framework and identifying potential
transactions in which the imposition of precontractual disclosure is
appropriate, it is important to establish that the default rule does not require
precontractual disclosure between contracting parties and to discuss the
theoretical foundation of the default rule, freedom of contract. This section
will then address the problem with the default rule, which is that most
contractual relationships suffer from information asymmetry, before
exploring the nuanced balance at play between information asymmetry and
freedom of contract.
A. No Duty of Precontractual Disclosure
In the absence of a statutory mandate
disclosure, one is tempted to look to the duty of
imposed upon all commercial transactions by
Code (“UCC”)10 and the Restatement

regarding precontractual
good faith and fair dealing
the Uniform Commercial
(Second) of Contracts

9

This section’s title pays homage to Michael Trebilcock’s seminal work, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993).
10
The UCC definitively states that “[e]very contract or duty [under the UCC] imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” See U.C.C. § 1-203 (2012).
The UCC has been adopted by every state. See Edward Lee, Warming up to UserGenerated Content, U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (2008) (noting “[t]he universal adoption of
the U.C.C. (at least in some form) by all fifty states”). The UCC has different standards of
good faith for merchants. See Zipporah Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 524 n.258 (1987). However, this distinction
has no bearing on the arguments of this article.
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(“Restatement”).11 It is conceivable that the definition of good faith, the
default rule that governs contracting parties, might include precontractual
obligations. Unfortunately, neither the UCC nor the Restatement provides a
particularly satisfying definition of “good faith.”12 This failure is not
peculiar to the drafters of the UCC or the Restatement, as the process of
defining “good faith” has proven to be a frustrating endeavor and it remains
a fairly nebulous concept.13 So much, in fact, that Professor Robert
Summers has suggested that “the very idea of good faith … is simply not
the kind of idea that is susceptible of … a definitional approach.”14
Professor Summers continues to state that “[m]any commentators suggest
they are willing to accept that good faith cannot, as such, be usefully
defined in terms of a single, general, positive meaning.”15
Beyond definitional difficulties, even if the duty of good faith required
some level of disclosure (a notion that is debatable), the duty of good faith
would not govern any precontractual period.16 This is, perhaps, reasonable.
Individuals enter into contracts on a near daily basis, and thus, in some
sense, everyone is in a precontractual period at any given moment. At what
point does an individual’s consideration of a contractual relationship rise to
a sufficient level to be considered precontractual? This issue may have
convinced the drafters of the UCC and the Restatement to steer clear of any
11

The Restatement, with similar conclusiveness, imposes upon each party a “duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). The Restatement defines “good faith” as “faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.”
Id. at cmt. A. For the purposes of this article, it is not important to determine if the UCC or
the Restatement would apply to the transaction at issue.
12
The UCC defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” U.C.C. § 1-203.
13
See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – its recognition and
conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818 (1982) (“[S]ome words and phrases do
not have a general positive meaning of their own within the contexts or realms of discourse
in which they are home.”).
14
Id. at 830.
15
Id. at 829.
16
Eric H. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure
in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 382, n.3 (1978) (noting that “the U.C.C.
and the Restatement do not extend [good faith] to the bargaining stage of contract
formation”). However, some scholars suggest that this is not necessarily the case. See
Palmieri, supra note 5, at 70 (arguing that the exceptions to the general rule (that parties do
not have a duty of precontractual disclosure) have rendered the general rule inapplicable);
see also Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer be Well Informed? – Doubting the Demise of
Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 389 (1996) (noting “the nationwide erosion of the
common-law doctrine of caveat emptor in transactions in real property.”). In addition, a
minority of courts have held that the UCC requirement of good faith extends to
negotiations. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, No. 0053810, 1991 WL
204359 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991).
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period in which a contract is not in place.
However, even if one were to clearly define the precontractual period
(for example, as this article does, as the period beginning at the point in
which a party evidences an intent to enter into a negotiation and ending
upon either execution of a contract or a party ceasing negotiations) and
impose good faith upon such period, it is not clear that the duty of good
faith would impose a duty of disclosure. This is generally true even when
one party knows something that the other party does not. This is justified
largely by the theory of freedom of contract.17
B. Freedom of Contract
Freedom of contract has been described, with no intended hyperbole, as
“the foundation of contract law.”18 Freedom of contract is, in the simplest of
terms, the absolute right of parties to decide to contract (or not contract)
with one another and to determine the terms of such contract.19 This theory
places a primacy upon private ordering, and argues against outside
regulation of contracts. The freedom of contract theory assumes that
“contracts that support legitimate economic exchange are at least
presumptively enforceable,”20 and posits that courts, legislators, and other
regulators should generally avoid investigating such contracts.21 This is not
only because regulation is an affront to the contracting parties’ right to
order their affairs, but also because of the assumption that parties will, if
acting rationally, reach an agreement that represents the most efficient use
of the respective parties’ goods or services.22 In sum, freedom of contract is
“the idea, fundamental in the orthodox understanding of contract law, that
the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the
17

Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law §2.2.1, in
THE HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007) (noting that “[t]he threshold issue in any discussion of contract law is freedom of
contract – the extent to which the law sanctions the use of contracts as a commitment
device.”).
18
Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 669, 684 (2010).
19
See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, at 625 (1983). This theory “has two distinct dimensions: The first–freedom from
contract–stipulates that persons should not have contractual obligations imposed on them
without their consent. The second–freedom to contract–stipulates that persons should have
the power to alter by consent their legal relations.” Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with
Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1023-24 (1992).
20
See Hermalin, et. al, supra note 17, at §2, 19.
21
See Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 2-8 (1993).
22
See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 708 (2012).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216

31-Aug-12]

MANDATING PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE

9

law.”23
As a normative theory, freedom of contract enjoys wide support.24 The
economic justification for freedom of contract, for example, lies in the
assumption that individuals will act in their own best interests, and third
parties should therefore refrain from imposing their judgment upon a
privately-ordered arrangement.25 In addition to the economic justification,
support for freedom of contract also has a political justification, in that an
individual’s freedom to privately order his or her affairs places the highest
value on such individual’s consent (or for that matter, his or her right not to
consent) to any given transaction.26 Freedom of contract adherents also cite
a social justice justification, noting that the freedom of contract has the
power to liberate parties from “traditional inequality and immobility” by
giving each individual the equal right to freely determine the terms of his or
her agreements.27 In addition, freedom of contract also enjoys the support of
instrumentalists (arguing that freedom of contract results in the highest use
of property)28 and moralists (arguing that freedom of contract supports the
moral justifications for enforcing contracts).29
Despite the broad support in favor of freedom of contract, many of its
justifications rely upon each party having a certain level of access to
information. Equal access to information, however, is seldom found in
contracting relationships.30 As discussed below, the existence of
information asymmetry in many contracting relationships presents some
problems for the freedom of contract theory.

23

STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59 (2004).
As explained by Professor Robert Hillman, “the centrality of contractual freedom in
American jurisprudence derives in part from society’s fervent respect for individual
freedom and strong faith in limited government.” ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF
CONTRACT LAW, 9 (1997).
25
Id. This rather pithy statement belies the voluminous economic arguments laid out in
favor of freedom of contract. For a more nuanced and complete discussion of the economic
arguments in favor of freedom of contract, see Hermalin, et. al, supra note 17, at §2, 22.
26
See Hillman, supra note 24, at 8 (noting that “[p]rivate ordering is the quintessential
form of government with the consent of the governed”).
27
See id. at 11 (quoting Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Some Reflections on Status and Freedom,
in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 236 (1962)).
28
Id. (noting that “[f]ree contracting … enables goods and services to move ‘from less to
more valuable uses’” (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 79
(1986))).
29
Id. at 12 (noting that “the moral obligation from making a promise is the key to contract
enforcement” (citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981))). This is by no means an exhaustive list of the support
for freedom of contract. For a more complete discussion, see Trebilcock, supra note 21, at
2-8.
30
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
24
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C. Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry exists whenever a party to a contract does not
enjoy the same level of access as such party’s contracting counterpart.31 If
each party enjoys equal access to the fact at issue, there is no need to require
disclosure. However, equal access is rarely the case, and information
asymmetry is the norm, not the exception. Practically every agreement will
suffer from some imbalance in information because absolute information
symmetry is virtually impossible to obtain. As illustrated by Professor
Michael Trebilcock,
[a]lmost no exchanges are entered into with absolutely
perfect information by both parties. Even the purchase of
the morning newspaper in the local variety store on the
assumption that it will contain an interesting film or
restaurant review, when this assumption turns out to be
false, reflects an exchange entered into with incomplete
information.32
This virtual ubiquity of information asymmetry may at first appear
troubling. Intuitive notions of “fair play and due process” suggest that
contracts where information asymmetry is great should not be
enforceable.33 However, information asymmetry plays a vital function in the
marketplace, and it should not be eliminated without good cause.
The primary defense of information asymmetry is economic.
Information is not free. As such, an economically rational society should
fashion a regulatory environment which rewards those who invest in
information discovery. A familiar illustration of this argument is the
hypothetical in which a prospector incurs various expenses to investigate a
piece of farmland. After engaging in costly studies and measurements, the
prospector determines there is a high likelihood of a precious mineral under
the land.34 Upon this discovery, the prospector makes an offer to buy the
land at a price based upon the land’s use as farmland (i.e., without
consideration of the value of the minerals). If the prospector’s investigation
proves correct and minerals exist under the land, the prospector would reap
a great profit, thereby justifying the investigation’s expense.
If a regulatory environment removed all information asymmetry, the
31

See Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 102-26.
See id. at 103.
33
See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TULANE L. REV. 1519, 1531 (2010) (noting that “due
process requires ‘fair warning,’ which in the context of criminal law means that citizens
can be punished only for violating laws on the books …. Yet we all know that people rarely
read criminal statutes.”).
34
See Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 108.
32
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prospector would not reap such benefit. If, for example, regulations required
disclosure to remedy information symmetry in the hypothetical, the
prospector would be forced to disclose the results of his investigation (the
probability of minerals under the land), and the farmer, assuming economic
rationality, would demand a higher price. This “effectively deprives [the
prospector] of any economic return on his investments in acquiring the
information.”35 Thus, if mandatory disclosure were a default requirement, it
is likely that the prospector would not engage in any investigation because
of the related expenses. Ultimately, the minerals would not be discovered,
the land would continue as farmland, and the highest possible economic use
of the land would not be realized.
This hypothetical illustrates how information asymmetry provides an
incentive for individuals to undertake the expenses of information
collection. However, despite the argument that mandated disclosure might
devalue information and may disincentivize both information gathering and
the highest potential use of property, there are instances in which mandating
disclosure is proper. This occurs when information asymmetries are so great
that they challenge the justifications of freedom of contract and overcome
the rationale of incentivizing information gathering.
1. Freedom of Contract and Information Symmetry
Pure freedom of contract theory promotes individual authority to
structure and commit to agreements without regulatory burdens. But most
freedom of contract justifications founder when faced with the reality of
information asymmetry. This is because the natural consequences of
information asymmetry undermine the freedom of contract justifications.
For example, in the presence of an information imbalance, a party may
agree to unanticipated inefficiencies (upsetting freedom of contract’s
assumption that the private arrangement is the best use of the parties’ goods
or services),36 enter into an agreement without fully contemplating the
implications (undermining the purported political justifications of freedom
of contract),37 or enter into an agreement with false assumptions of the
exchanged value (virtually eliminating any chance that the agreement will
serve freedom of contract’s social justice purpose).38 These results are
troubling to many freedom of contract adherents, as Professor Trebilcock
notes, “[e]ven the most committed proponents of free markets and freedom
of contract recognize that certain information preconditions” are required to
35

Id. at 109.
See Hillman, supra note 24, at 11.
37
Id. at 8.
38
Id. at 11.
36
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achieve freedom of contract’s promised efficiencies.39
Despite these issues, some commentators argue that information
asymmetry does not pose any problems for freedom of contract. Indeed,
some argue that information asymmetry is as necessary as it is pervasive.
This argument posits that a legal system which has eliminated all
information asymmetries is a false utopia, promising potential peril.
Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger argues that “a commitment to cancel
out every inequality of power or knowledge as soon as it arose would also
undermine a contract system,” explaining that
[r]eal markets are never just machines for instantaneous
transactions
among
economic
agents
equally
knowledgeable and equally able to await the next offer or
to withdraw from current courses of dealing. Continued
success in market transactions shows partly in the buildup
of advantages of power or knowledge that enable their
beneficiaries to do that much better in the next round of
transactions. If everyone were quickly restored to a
situation of equality within the market order, the method
responsible for this restoration … would empty market
transactions of much of their apparent significance.40
Thus, Professor Unger argues that information asymmetries are not only a
reality of markets, but are a necessity for market survival.41 From this
perspective, elimination of information asymmetry would not only rob
private actors of their right to privately order their agreements, but it would
also prove disastrous to a market-based system.
2. Eliminating Information Asymmetry Supports Freedom of Contract
Professor Unger’s arguments notwithstanding, certain information
asymmetries pose problems for freedom of contract adherents because it
belies the assumption that the parties are freely entering into a contract. For
a theory with a basis in individual freedom, this presents a challenge.
Information asymmetry in the contracting relationship “impairs one’s
ability to make decisions of the fully rational kind postulated in economic
39

See Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 102. To make his point, Professor Trebilcock cites
Milton Friedman’s statement that “[t]he possibility of coordination through voluntary
cooperation rests on the elementary – yet frequently denied – proposition that both parties
to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary
and informed.”
40
See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, 626 (1983).
41
See also Jay P. Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic
Commerce, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1509 (2004).
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discourse.”42 In essence, a decision made without some minimum level of
information will not support the efficiency arguments of freedom of
contract because the party without such information did not, in effect, make
a decision. Or as more succinctly posited by Professor Kim Lane Scheppele,
information is a “precondition of choice.”43 Professor Scheppele continues
to explain that “one needs a certain amount of information in order to be
able to imagine one’s alternatives, to understand enough of their
implications to be able to distinguish among them, and to assess which one
would best realize one’s aims.”44 In other words, if information
asymmetries have rendered it impossible for a party to make an informed
decision, then such party enters into the contract without making a true
choice. This “decision” to enter into a contract, therefore, is no decision at
all, and is counter to freedom of contract principles.45
With all due respect to Professor Unger, this article adheres to Professor
Scheppele’s argument that some form of information balance is necessary
to have true freedom of contract. This maxim suggests that a disclosure
regime which selectively reduces information asymmetry is not necessarily
counter to freedom of contract. By ensuring an equality of information in
certain relationships, precontractual disclosure gives the contracting parties
the right to make an informed decision concerning the agreement.
II. THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
Given the threats posed by information asymmetry, it should not be
surprising that courts and legislatures have often departed from the general
rule against any duty of precontractual disclosure. Common law disclosure
obligations have been established by more than two centuries of case law,
and statutory disclosure obligations can be found in some of the most
fundamental of regulatory statutes. These exceptions serve as proof that the
general rule against mandated disclosure is not appropriate in all
circumstances. At first blush, these exceptions to the general rule appear
fact-specific and narrow. However, upon closer inspection, the exceptions
have similarities that may be distilled into general principles, which may be
used to craft a more universal rule. This universal rule, explained in more
detail below, serves as an analytical framework for legislators to use when
considering the imposition of precontractual disclosure upon a particular
relationship. This framework involves first analyzing the information
42

EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 107 (1980).
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAW 25 (1988).
44
Id.
45
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
43
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asymmetry in the contractual relationship and then identifying and weighing
the stakeholder interest in promoting precontractual disclosure in the
particular transaction (the “Disclosure Framework”).
A. Step One: The Information Asymmetry Analysis
The first step of the Disclosure Framework is an analysis of the
information asymmetry between the contracting parties. Generally
speaking, the focus of this analysis is on the ability of the parties to access
the fact to be disclosed. This factor has an intuitive appeal: if a fact is
readily accessible to both parties, where is the need for mandated
disclosure? Indeed, if a material fact is neither in the sole possession of a
party nor difficult for either party to unveil, then a compelling argument to
require disclosure is difficult to make.46
At the other extreme, the mere existence of information asymmetry
should not satisfy the first step of the Disclosure Framework because
information asymmetry exists at some level in virtually every contractual
relationship.47 Given this near ubiquity, the first step would be an irrelevant
formality if any amount of information asymmetry satisfied the inquiry.
Rather, this analysis uses a modified version of the equal access analysis
proposed by Professor Scheppele. As set forth by Professor Scheppele, the
inquiry relies upon the parties’ equal access to material information. Equal
access exists when the parties have “equal probabilities of finding the
information if they put in the same level of effort.”48 As explained by
Professor Scheppele,
two people would be said to have equal access to today’s
headlines because each could buy a newspaper, turn on the
radio, watch the television, or listen to a conversation on the
street. Given equal levels of effort, the two people could
probably discover the news…. This does not mean that the
two people would have the same information (one may prefer
to listen to a baseball game; another may have too many
46

See Palmieri, supra note 5, at 76 (noting that a duty of precontractual disclosure “does
not mean to suggest that the parties ought to forgo their own independent investigation of
the facts. While an investigation may impact on the duty of disclosure, it is always
advisable to be as informed as possible before entering any transaction.”).
47
See Trebilcock, supra note 21, at 103.
48
See SCHEPPELE, supra note 43, at 120. The first step in the Disclosure Analysis does not
include Professor Scheppele’s inquiry into the capability of each party to expend the
equivalent level of effort. This is not intended to devalue this step, but is rather to maintain
the focus on the operative inquiry for the Disclosure Analysis: equal probability of
discovery given equal effort expended. Capability of the parties is certainly an issue, but
not one addressed by this article.
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other obligations to pay much attention to the news). But
should each actor want to know the news, each would have to
put in roughly the same effort to acquire it…. Equal access
does not require that effort will always be successful; it only
requires that equal effort is rewarded with equal probabilities
of success.49
In situations in which the contracting parties do not have such equal access,
the information asymmetry is high enough to justify moving on to the
second step of the Disclosure Framework, the stakeholder analysis.
B. Step Two: The Stakeholder Analysis
As noted above, information asymmetry will exist, at some level, in
virtually every contractual relationship. Even when limited by the first step
of the Disclosure Analysis, many contracting relationships will suffer from
some level of information asymmetry. Some of these relationships are not
ideal candidates for imposing precontractual disclosure (if, for example, the
information asymmetries in such relationships support freedom of contract
principles). Thus, the Disclosure Framework requires a limiting principle to
specifically identify the instances of information asymmetry which are
counter to freedom of contract. This principle must operate to limit the
application of the Disclosure Framework when, despite the information
asymmetry in a particular contractual relationship, there is not a strong
enough public interest in imposing precontractual disclosure. This limiting
principle directly addresses whether lawmakers are the proper actors to
require precontractual disclosure. In other words, the inquiry is whether the
transaction is “so far affected with a public interest as to justify legislative
regulation.”50
Of course, before one can weigh the public interest,51 one must settle
upon a definition. Unfortunately, the definition of public interest is neither
obvious nor self-evident. Rather, public interest is a malleable52 concept
49

Id. Professor Scheppele continues to state that “[o]ne person’s lucky break does not
interfere with equal access as long as the other person with whom she deals has faced the
same chance of a fortuitous fate.”
50
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406 (1914).
51
The case law that weighs public interest is not exceedingly helpful. See, e.g., Northeast
Utils. Serv. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 55 F.3d 686, 692 (1st Cir. 1995), which states rather
cryptically, presumably in an attempt to clarify the proper means to weigh the public
interest, that “[i]t all depends on whose ox is gored and how the public interest is affected.”
52
Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Paper Presentation at Midwest Political Science
Association: Ties That Bind: Defining the Public Interest, Stage One, (April 12-14, 1984)
(“The concept of public interest is elusive. Most have not attempted to define the term and
those who have have been apologetic for their efforts.”).
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often molded to match to the desires of the speaker.53 One may be tempted
to resort to the definition proposed by Black’s Law Dictionary, which
confidently states that public interest is “[t]he general welfare of the public
that warrants recognition and protection.”54 This definition, however, fails
to provide a reliable manner in which to weigh public interest. After all, the
“general welfare of the public” is ever-present, albeit in differing degrees.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that “the public interest is
concerned in every transaction between men,” and that it permeates “the
sum of the transactions constituting the activities of life.”55 To put a finer
point on it, the definition of “public interest” often turns on context.
For purposes of the Disclosure Framework, this article adopts a
stakeholder-based definition of public interest.56 Under this approach,
before it is appropriate to impose precontractual disclosure obligations, one
must identify the relevant stakeholders by determining the parties who are
directly affected by the transaction. Once identified, the interest of the
stakeholder group must be weighed against the interest of the contracting
parties to define the contours of their agreement.
It is important to note that the only pertinent stakeholder interest for this
factor of the Disclosure Framework is an interest in encouraging
precontractual disclosure. Any other articulated interest will not suffice. The
target transaction is, after all, a private agreement between private parties,
and lawmakers should not lightly intervene in such transactions.57 Or as
stated by Professor Lenore Weitzman, “unless some countervailing interest
must come into account which would be sacrificed in the process, it would
seem that the individual interest in promised advantages should be secured
to the full extent of what has been assured him by the deliberate promise of
another.”58 This countervailing interest is the stakeholder group’s interest in
promoting precontractual disclosure in the transaction–that is, the
stakeholder group’s interest in increasing efficiency in the transaction by
reducing information asymmetry. Put another way, the stakeholder interest
is great enough to satisfy the second step of the Disclosure Framework
when the interests of third-party stakeholders in encouraging efficiency in
the transaction significantly outweigh the interests of the contracting
parties’ desire to use information asymmetries as negotiating leverage.
53

Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1973) (“The phrase ‘public interest’ …
has been subject to conflicting interpretations, often colored by personal prejudices and
predilections.”).
54
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1266 (8th ed. 2004).
55
German Alliance, 233 U.S. at 406.
56
This approach is, in part, identified by taking cues from the precontractual disclosure
statutes discussed below. See infra Section III.
57
See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT, 137 (1981).
58
Id.
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The first step in the stakeholder analysis is identifying all parties that are
directly affected by the transaction that have an interest in promoting
precontractual disclosure in the transaction. These parties make up the
stakeholder group. The next step is to weigh (i) the costs suffered by the
stakeholder group if precontractual disclosure were not imposed against (ii)
the costs suffered by the party forced to disclose.59 As with other concepts
that pose definitional difficulties,60 it might be more illuminating to explain
this factor by discussing examples.
III. THE BASIS OF THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK: EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
AGAINST PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE
The default rule against the imposition of precontractual disclosure has
many exceptions. These exceptions, whether imposed by courts or
legislators, exhibit similarities which provide a foundation for the
Disclosure Framework. As discussed in this section, each exception justifies
precontractual disclosure because the transaction at issue suffered from an
information asymmetry (i.e., the parties did not enjoy equal access to the
fact to be disclosed), and the harm suffered by the stakeholder group due to
nondisclosure outweighed the harm suffered by the party forced to disclose.
In other words, each of the exceptions to the default rule meets the
requirements of the two factors of the Disclosure Framework. The
discussion in this section will prove that the Disclosure Framework is not
only theoretically sound, but is also consistent with current statutory and
common law departures from the default rule. This section will discuss a
common law exception (the imposition of precontractual disclosure in
marine insurance contracts), a federal statutory exception (the
precontractual disclosures required in certain sales of private securities), and
an exception first addressed by courts and later codified by a state
legislature (the duty of a seller or broker to disclose certain facts to a
potential home buyer).
A. Common Law Exceptions to the General Rule
The general rule that there is no duty of precontractual disclosure has a
59

It may be apparent that this prong of the Disclosure Framework is not immune to
manipulation. Clearly, the impact upon stakeholders is highly dependent on both how one
defines a stakeholder and how one measures the transaction’s impact upon such
stakeholders. The specter of manipulation, however, should not cast doubt upon the utility
of the Disclosure Framework. Given that this test is proposed for use by lawmakers, some
flexibility in its applicability is ideal.
60
See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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number of common law exceptions.61 These exceptions include a duty to
disclose facts (i) to avoid active concealment;62 (ii) to correct previously
made material representations;63 (iii) to ensure that any disclosures
voluntarily given are complete and full;64 (iv) in certain special
relationships;65 and (v) to ensure a party is not acting upon a mistaken
understanding of such information.66 In addition to these exceptions, courts
have imposed a duty of precontractual disclosure in certain industries. This
section focuses on the oldest example of a common law imposition of
precontractual disclosure, the judicially-imposed duty to disclose material
facts in marine insurance contracts. Analysis of this duty will illustrate that
the common law justifications for imposing precontractual disclosure in
marine insurance contracts mirror the factors of the Disclosure Framework:
information asymmetry and a strong stakeholder group interest in
promoting disclosure in the contractual relationship.

61

See Holmes, supra note 16, at 382, n.3.
See Klott v. Assocs. Real Estate, 322 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (noting a “a
duty imposed by law to speak” in the presence of “a dangerous latent defect in the property
not readily discoverable by the vendee. By way of example, if there be a contaminated
well, known to the vendor and undisclosed to the vendee, the concealment of such may
well constitute actionable fraud.”); see also Holman v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc.,
972 So.2d 564, 568 (Miss. 2008) (“The duty to disclose is based upon a theory of fraud that
recognizes that the failure of a party to a business transaction to speak may amount to a
suppression of a material fact which should have been disclosed and is, in effect, fraud.”).
63
See Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888) (noting that if a
party “fraudulently produc[es] a false impression upon the mind of the other party … it is
unimportant whether the means of accomplishing it are words or acts of the defendant, or
his concealment or suppression of material facts not equally within the knowledge or reach
of the plaintiff.”).
64
See Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 289 (Ky. 1908) (noting that “there are times and
occasions when it is the duty of a person to speak in order that the party he is dealing with
may be placed on an equal footing with him as when the knowledge he possesses is not
within the fair and reasonable reach of the other”).
65
See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz.1937) (“It is the general rule
of law that, where a relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one of
them places peculiar reliance in the trustworthiness of another, the latter is under a duty to
make a full and truthful disclosure of all material facts.”).
66
U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., 757 F.Supp. 1053, 1057 (N.D.Cal. 1991)
(“[A] duty to disclose arises when one party possesses superior knowledge not readily
available to the other and that party knows the other is acting on the basis of mistaken
knowledge.”); see Janel World Trade, Ltd. v. World Logistics Servs., Inc., 2009 WL
735072 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), at *10 (“A duty to disclose between negotiating parties arises…
where one party has superior knowledge of certain information, that information is not
readily available to the other party, and the first party knows that the second party is acting
on the basis of mistaken knowledge” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62
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1. Precontractual Disclosure in Marine Insurance Contracts
Both American and British courts have deviated from the general rule
by imposing precontractual disclosure in certain insurance contracts. More
specifically, in marine insurance contracts, court decisions have held that
parties must disclose material facts before the insurance contract is in place.
This requirement allows contracting parties to void contracts completely if
the other party fails to disclose material facts prior to contract execution,
regardless of intent. Despite the lack of a scienter requirement and the
potentially harsh consequences, courts have largely fallen in line to develop
a fairly reliable definition for the doctrine: a material misrepresentation or
omission, whether or not in response to a specific inquiry, renders the
insurance contract voidable. The marine insurance industry has been subject
to this requirement of precontractual disclosure for nearly two and a half
centuries.67 Initially, this requirement was justified under the concept of
uberrimae fides,68 or utmost good faith, first established in Carter v.
Boehm.69
Carter involved Fort Marlborough, a structure built by the British East
India Company on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia.70 The fort’s governor,
Mr. Carter, wary of an attack by French forces, purchased an insurance
policy from Mr. Boehm against “being taken by a foreign enemy.”71 The
fort was, in fact, later taken by a French expeditionary force.72 Mr. Carter
attempted to collect on the policy, and Mr. Boehm balked, arguing that Mr.
Carter was aware that the fort was not “designed to resist European
enemies” (i.e., the French) but was “only calculated for defen[se] against
the natives of the island of Sumatra.”73 Mr. Boehm argued that this fact
should have been disclosed.74

67

The requirement was born in common law and later codified in various statutes. E.g.,
British Marine Insurance Act of 1906, 6 & 7 Edw., c. 41.
68
Other spellings that have appeared in court decisions are “uberrima fides” and
“uberrimae fidae.” See Holmes, supra note 16, at 105.5 n.624.
69
Carter v. Boehm (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162.
70
Id. at 1163.
71
Id. The policy was actually entered into by the governor’s brother, on behalf of the
governor.
72
Id. at 1163. Rather dramatically, the court noted that “[t]he event happened: the fort was
taken by Count D’Estaigne, within the year.” The Court noted that a “French man of war”
overtook the fort with “64 guns and a frigate of twenty guns.” Id. at 1166.
73
Id. at 1166. The court noted that it was “proved without contradiction” that the fort was
“not established for a place of arms or defen[s]e against the attacks of a[] European enemy;
but merely for the purpose of trade, and of defen[s]e against the natives.”
74
Id. Presumably, the French boasted more advanced weaponry.
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The Carter court, applying utmost good faith,75 held that Mr. Carter was
obligated to disclose all facts that would materially affect the risk taken by
Mr. Boehm,76 even in the absence of fraudulent intent or knowledge.77 The
court held that such disclosure would have included the fort’s insufficient
defenses and should have been communicated before the insurance contract
was in place.78 Thus, the Carter court imposed a precontractual duty to
disclose material facts in marine insurance contracts.79 This precontractual
duty has survived to this day.80
Not unlike other areas of jurisprudence, American courts adopted the
British common law imposition of precontractual disclosure in marine
insurance contracts. The first definitive statement on the doctrine of utmost
good faith in American jurisprudence was the Supreme Court’s decision in
the case of McLanahan v. Universal Insurance Co.81 In McLanahan, the
court assertively states that “[t]he contract of insurance has been said to be a
contract uberrimae fidei, and the principles which govern it, are those of an

75

Curiously, the court’s opinion does not mention either “uberrimae fidei” or “utmost good
faith.” However, the Carter opinion is widely held to have hinged upon the doctrine. See,
e.g., John Lowry, Wither the Duty of Good Faith in UK Insurance Contracts, 16 CONN.
INS. L. J. 97, 107 (2009) (noting that “[i]t is striking that throughout [the court’s] judgments
on the issue of non-disclosure [, the court] avoided the terminology of ‘utmost’ good faith.
Yet section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the preamble of which declares it to be a
codifying statute, states that insurance is uberrimae fidei.”).
76
Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164. (“The policy is void because the ris[k] run is really
different from the ris[k] understood and intended to be run, at the time of the agreement.”).
77
Id. at 1164 (“[a]lthough the suppression should happen through mistake, without any
fraudulent intention, yet still the [insurer] has been deceived”). At first blush, this duty may
appear to place an undue burden upon the insured, as the insurer appears to bear no duty to
investigate. However, later cases clarified that an insurer has a duty to investigate and may
not rely upon unreasonable ignorance. See, e.g., Noble. v. Kennoway (1780) 99 Eng. Rep.
326, 327 (“Every [insurer] is presumed to be acquainted with the practice of the trade he
insures…. If he does not know it, he ought to inform himself.”).
78
Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164 (“The special facts … lie most commonly in the knowledge
of the insured only; the under-writer trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge…. The keeping
back such circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy is void.”).
79
See Lowry, supra note 75, at 104.
80
Although the court intended the standard of utmost good faith to apply in all commercial
transactions, later decisions limited the duty to the marine insurance industry. See Lowry,
supra note 75, at 98 (noting that the Carter court “was at the time attempting to import into
English commercial law the civil law notion of good faith, but this ultimately proved
unsuccessful and only survived for a very limited class of transactions.”).
81
26 U.S. 170, 185 (1828); see also Columbian Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence, 27
U.S. 25, 29 (1829) (noting that “fair dealing requires that [the insured] should state
everything which might influence, and probably would influence the mind of the [insurer]
in forming or declining the contract.”).
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enlightened moral policy.”82 In imposing a precontractual duty to disclose
facts, the McLanahan court followed the Carter court’s refusal to impose a
scienter requirement, and noted that “even if there be no intentional fraud,
still the underwriter has a right to a disclosure of all material facts … and
the omission is fatal” to the contract.83
The following sections will reveal that if the Disclosure Framework
were in use at the time of the Carter decision, the court’s analysis would
result in the same outcome. This is because (i) the information asymmetry
analysis of the Disclosure Framework mirrors the Carter court’s concerns
about the actions of the parties and (ii) the stakeholder analysis reveals that
the harm of mandated disclosure upon Mr. Carter is much lower than the
harm of nondisclosure suffered by the stakeholder group.
2. The Marine Insurance Information Asymmetry Analysis
Under the Disclosure Framework, information asymmetry will only give
rise to precontractual disclosure obligations if parties to the transaction do
not have equal access. Equal access is satisfied when each party has an
equal probability of discovering the information if such party were to
expend the same level of effort.84
The lack of equal access to facts was a primary motivating factor for the
imposition of precontractual disclosure in Carter. Indeed, in the insurance
market, the insured often enjoys near exclusive access to the pertinent
information: the goods to be insured.85 This is a concern of the Carter court,
as reflected by the court’s assertion that precontractual disclosure is
appropriate when the facts to be disclosed “lie most commonly in the
knowledge of the insured only.”86 In Carter, a letter which foretold the
82

McLanahan, 26 U.S. at 185.
Id.
84
See SCHEPPELE, supra, note 43.
85
Similarly, the reinsurance market imposes a precontractual duty to disclose material
information regarding the reinsured’s risk because “[t]he knowledge of the risk, both in the
disclosure of material information used to set the premium, and in the actual administration
of the contract, lies with the ceding insurer” (as opposed to the reinsurer), See Steven W.
Thomas, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition in Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE
L. J. 1548, 1557-58 (1992)
[t]he absence of utmost good faith within the reinsurance market
[would] spawn increased costs as reinsurers are forced either to hire
their own investigative teams to verify and thus to duplicate the
assessment of the risk by the ceding insurers, or to increase premiums
to cover greater risk. Reinsurers and ceding insurers have depended on
the principle of utmost good faith … to prevent wasted supplication of
effort that would result in higher premiums.
86
Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
83
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French attack was in the sole possession of the insured and was not
disclosed to the insurer.87 In addition to predicting the French attack, this
letter admitted a “weakness of the fort,” noted that the fort was “badly
supplied with stores, arms, and ammunition,” and expressed concern that it
would not withstand an attack from a “European” enemy.88 The Carter
court held that this information, being in the sole possession of the insured,
should have been disclosed to the insurer prior to the contract’s execution.89
The Carter court stresses the reliance of the insurer (the information-poor
party) by noting that the insurer “trusts [the insured’s] representation, and
proceeds upon confidence that [the insured] does not keep back any
circumstance in [the insured’s] knowledge.”90
Given these facts, it is clear that the insurer did not enjoy equal access to
the information. While a modern reader may not have much sympathy for
the insurer, it is important to remember that both transportation and
communication were far more difficult in 18th century England. Many
marine insurance contracts covered “cargo or ships that were often at distant
ports.”91 Insurers, therefore, could not feasibly investigate the subject matter
of an insurance policy absent a significant investment of both money and
time. To discover this information, the insurer would be forced to deploy an
investigator to travel a great distance by both land and sea to establish that
the doomed fort was as represented by the insured. A requirement that the
insurer personally inspect insured property, if not impossible, would in the
very least impose a great expense upon the insurer.92 This expense is
certainly greater than the expense the insured would expend to discover the
fort’s lacking defenses. Indeed, the insured’s expense is negligible, as the
insured knew of such facts by simply receiving and reading the undisclosed
letter. Thus, in Carter, the insurer did not enjoy equal access to the
information to be disclosed because if both Mr. Carter and Mr. Boehm
expended an identical amount of energy, the Mr. Carter would have a much
higher probability of discovering the fort’s insufficient defenses. The
information asymmetry in the Carter decision is therefore high enough to
satisfy the first factor of the Disclosure Framework.

87

Id. at 1166.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. The Carter court emphasizes the importance of accessibility by noting that “[t]he
insured need not mention what the under-writer ought to know.” Id. at 1165.
91
See Thomas, supra note 85, at 1555.
92
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Inlet Fisheries Inc., 518 F.3d 645, 646 (9th
Cir. 2008) (noting that “The doctrine of uberrimae fidei was … an economic necessity
where insurers had no reasonable means of obtaining this information efficiently, without
the ubiquity of telephones, email, digital photography, and air travel.”).
88
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3. The Marine Insurance Stakeholder Analysis
The first step in the stakeholder analysis is the identification of potential
stakeholders, or those with an interest in imposing precontractual disclosure
in marine insurance contracts. In Carter, Mr. Boehm, the insurer, has an
obvious interest in imposing precontractual disclosure (illustrated most
convincingly by the fact that nondisclosure was the basis of Mr. Boehm’s
defense).93 Mr. Boehm is therefore a stakeholder. Given that the Carter
decision imposed the duty of precontractual disclosure on all marine
insurance contracts,94 one may also justifiably identify any potential insurer
to a marine insurance contract as a stakeholder. Further, although it may
appear that insureds do not have an interest in imposing precontractual
disclosure (as the burden of disclosure will fall upon their shoulders),
insureds who do not wish to conceal any facts from their insurers have an
interest in imposing precontractual disclosure because it will result in lower
premium costs. This is because any undue costs expended by the insurer
(including costs of paying for destruction of ill-defended forts) will likely
result in higher premiums for such customers.95 The stakeholder
identification process does not end at this point, as there are additional
parties directly affected by the court’s mandate. Anyone who has a stake in
the economic health of the insurance company (owners, shareholders,
members, etc.) would also have a direct stake in requiring precontractual
disclosure to avoid the insurance company’s payment of unanticipated
losses (e.g., losses sustained by ill-defended forts).
At this point, it may appear that the stakeholder identification process is
quite broad. One obvious concern is that an identification of a high number
of stakeholders will inevitably result in a high stakeholder cost and the
Disclosure Framework analysis will always result in imposition of
precontractual disclosure. To allay this concern, please note that the
remaining exceptions discussed in this section reveal a much more limited
stakeholder group. Further, the second step in the stakeholder analysis
serves as the limiting factor. This step weighs the costs of nondisclosure
suffered by the stakeholder group against the costs suffered by the party
forced to disclose. In the marine insurance context, the potential costs of
93

See Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1906.
Id.
95
See Reed Abelson & Nina Bernstein, Health Insurers Push Premiums Sharply Higher,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011) (noting that insurance companies defending rising premiums
because “the use and price of medical services have continued to rise in individual and
small-group plans, in part because those policies tend to have a higher proportion of people
with serious illnesses.”).
94
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nondisclosure to the stakeholder group include either (i) the costs incurred
by the insurance company sending an agent to inspect the fort to discover
any material issues, or (ii) the insurance company being forced to pay for
unanticipated damages suffered by the fort. On the other hand, if
precontractual disclosure were imposed, the fort’s inadequate defenses
would be discovered, the individual insured’s insurance premium will be
increased,96 and the stakeholder group would avoid any economic harm.97
The costs to the stakeholder group have a much higher potential ceiling (the
economic harms of paying the unanticipated loss, rising insurance
premiums, and increased costs of inspection) than the potential costs to the
insured (the higher premium for the individual). Therefore, the stakeholder
analysis suggests that imposing precontractual disclosure is appropriate.
B. A Federal Statutory Exception to the General Rule
As noted in the previous section, there is a well-established common
law exception imposing a duty of precontractual disclosure in certain
contractual relationships, and the circumstances of this exception are in
harmony with the Disclosure Framework analysis. In addition to common
law, there are many instances in which the federal government has imposed
similar duties.98 This section will discuss one specific instance: the
regulation of private securities sales. The following section will examine the
justifications for the precontractual disclosure mechanism in the sales of
private securities and demonstrate how the mechanism satisfies the
Disclosure Framework analysis.
1. The Regulation of Private Sales of Securities
Throughout the late 19th century and the early decades of the 20th
century, business financing in America grew at an erratic and unsustainable
pace.99 Although warnings existed,100 proposed federal regulations were
96

Or more likely, the fort would not have been insured.
A member of the stakeholder group could cancel the insurance and select a different
insurance carrier. However, this creates more inefficiency, as every person required to buy
insurance would be required to inquire as to the company’s investigatory policies.
98
See Palmieri, supra note 5, at 213 (noting that “[s]ome statutes require disclosures in
certain contexts” (citing the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 2A) , the Truth in Lending
Act of 1968 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §
1691 et. seq.), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. 2601 et. seq.), the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1701 et. seq.), the Truth in
Negotiations Act (10 U.S.C. § 2306a), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)).
99
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
97
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unpopular and garnered little support.101 Left unregulated, the United States
securities markets virtually collapsed in what is commonly known as the
Great Depression.102
The effects of the Great Depression were both far-reaching and
devastating and need not be reiterated here. The response to the crisis,
however, is of great interest to this article. The Great Depression has been
described as a “plague so sweeping that it altered expectations about the
proper relationship of law to society,”103 and “sorely tested old
assumptions” of the superiority of “voluntary rather than governmental
regulation.”104 Thus, one imagines a fertile ground for regulation. Given this
environment, one might expect–indeed, one might demand–a proportionally
comparable paradigm-shifting response. The response, though manifold,
was primarily to impose disclosure requirements105 before a security is sold
(i.e., precontractual disclosure) through the Securities Act of 1933106 and
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE, 2 (1995)
(noting that “[f]rom 1920-1928, ‘prices on the New York Stock Exchange had
approximately doubled’ and “corporate profits … rose over 80 percent”).
100
Id. at 3 (noting that “[a]s early as 1925, [President] Hoover had been concerned about
the growing tide of speculation … and complained to President Coolidge about the Federal
Reserve Board’s easy money politics. But at the time, Hoover did not care to press such
views too firmly. Calvin Coolidge had achieved substantial popularity not by criticizing the
booming economy, but by identifying himself with it.”).
101
Seligman, supra note 99, at 2 (noting that “a majority of the country’s voters had
supported laissez-faire economic policies suggested by Calvin Coolidge’s often-quoted
remark ‘This is a business country … and it wants a business government”).
102
Id. at 1-2.
Between September 1, 1929, and July 1, 1932, the value of all stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange shrank from a total of nearly
$90 billion to just under $16 billion – a loss of 83 percent. In a
comparable period, bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange
declined from a value of $49 billion to $31 billion. … During the postWorld War I decade, approximately $50 billion of new securities were
sold in the United States. Approximately half or $25 billion would
prove near or totally valueless.”
103
KERMIT L. HALL AND PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, 290 (2009).
104
Id.
105
Disclosure, viewed by some as a “conservative response” to the Great Depression, was
the primary tool of the Securities Acts. See Seligman, supra note 99 at 29. Championed by
President Roosevelt, the required disclosure was intended to ameliorate the information
imbalance between a security’s buyer and seller. In endorsing the Securities Acts,
Roosevelt emphasized the importance of the disclosure requirements, noting that every sale
of securities “shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public.” Message to Congress on Federal Supervision of Investment Securities (Mar. 29,
1933), in 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
106
15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216

26

MANDATING PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE

[31-Aug-12

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.107 The bulk of the disclosure
requirements of these statutes concern companies that sell securities on the
open market (because such companies are generally large, the trading
activity of such companies is great, and the lack of regulation of such
companies was the primary reason for the Great Depression).108 However,
this article is more interested in the regulation of securities sales by private
companies (i.e., those that do not offer shares on the open market).
The focus on private securities is because the requirements of the
securities laws for such sales attempt to balance seemingly inconsistent
goals: loosening restrictions on private companies and maintaining
protections of potential investors. The sale of securities109 by private
companies is regulated by Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D.110 In
the interest of brevity, this article will restrict its discussion to issuances
under Rule 506, the most popular exemption.111
107

15 U.S.C. § 78a-pp; Seligman, supra note 99, at 39 (“[A] primary enduring mission of
the SEC has been to compel disclosure of data by firms involved in securities markets….
[T]his policy has become so well established, it is generally regarded as the appropriate or
inevitable method of regulating corporate finance.”).
108
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f (requiring registration with the SEC before an issuer may sell any
securities to the public. This registration is intended to “provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce.”); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (1977) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
109
Due in part to the overwhelming regulatory influence of securities laws in this area, one
may fail to consider the sale of a security as a contractual relationship. However, this
relationship is, in essence, a contract governing one party’s purchase of a good from
another party.
110
17 C.F.R. § 230.501. These rules were promulgated by the SEC under the power
granted by Section 3(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which authorizes the SEC
to exempt any certain offerings from regulation if the SEC “finds that the enforcement …
with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection
of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public
offering.”
111
Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. Peter D. Fetzer, Terry D. Nelson, & A. Michael Primo, THE
BUSINESS LAWYER, The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for
the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions (noting that “roughly 80 percent” of all private
offerings are under Rule 506); See also The JOBS Act; Rule 506 Accredited Investor Only
Offerings Likely to Be Even More Popular, MARTINDALE.COM (May 4, 2012),
http://www.martindale.com/business-law/article_Foley-Lardner-LLP_1507198.htm (noting
that Rule 506 offerings are the “most popular of the three types of non-registered offerings
available under Regulation D” due to the “unlimited amount of funds that could be raised
for such offerings and that state securities law registration requirements are preempted by
federal law for such offerings”). Rule 506 is a safe harbor for the exemption provided
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, which exempts “transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering.” See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a). Rule 506 was drafted to fall
within this exemption, specifically noting that Rule 506 issuances “shall be deemed to be
transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2)” of the
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Rule 506 allows a company to sell securities without registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) if the company abides by
certain rules.112 Because registration with the SEC can, for many
companies, prove prohibitively expensive,113 Rule 506 is popular among
smaller companies looking to raise funds.114
Rule 506 treats sales of securities to accredited investors115 differently
from sales to non-accredited investors.116 With respect to individuals, an
accredited investor is generally a person with sufficient net worth to
withstand a complete loss of the investment.117 If any purchasers are nonaccredited, then the issuer must both reasonably believe that each such nonaccredited investor has enough business experience to be capable of
evaluating the investment,118 and, most importantly for this article, provide
certain disclosures before the sale may be consummated.119
Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
112
17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
113
See Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Exchange Act
Release No. 6339, 23 SEC Docket 446 (Aug. 7, 1981) (“The registration requirements of
the Securities Act and the exemptive scheme therefrom have been criticized by
commentators as disproportionately burdensome for small issuers.”).
114
See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: the Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 921 (2011) (noting
that “[w]ith regard to capital formation, Regulation D was based on the correct assumptions
that transaction costs (offering costs) can throttle capital formation and that it is relative,
not absolute, offering costs that are important in that regard)”.
115
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
116
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, 2011
WL 6415435 at *2 (Dec. 29, 2011) (“One purpose of the accredited investor concept is to
identify persons who can bear the economic risk of an investment in unregistered
securities, including the ability to hold unregistered (and therefore less liquid) securities for
an indefinite period and, if necessary, to afford a complete loss of such investment.”).
117
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). Currently, sufficient net worth means a person with a net worth
of over $1,000,000 (not including the value of the individual’s primary residence); or (iii) a
person whose income exceeded $200,000 in each of the past two years (or $300,000 if
combined with spouse’s income).
118
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii)
Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with
his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably
believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser
comes within this description.
Note, however, that “[m]any commentators have expressed the view that it is impossible to
evaluate an offeree’s qualifications without providing the offeree basic information
concerning the offering.” See Securities Act Release No. 6339, 1981 WL 31063 at *21.
119
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (“If the issuer sells securities under … Rule 506 to any
purchaser that is not an accredited investor, the issuer shall furnish the information
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If the proposed sale is to accredited investors, the company-issuer has
some discretion on what information is provided.120 However, if the sale is
to non-accredited investors, the company-issuer must provide financial
information (in addition to certain other disclosures) prior to the sale.121 The
breadth of the financial disclosures depends on the size of the offering, with
larger offerings requiring more detailed disclosures.122 Because private
companies are not required to register financial statements with the SEC,
such information is not normally available to potential purchasers.123
The apparent impetus in promulgating Rule 506 was to provide an
efficient mechanism for small businesses to raise money. In justifying the
Rule 506 exemption, the SEC noted that small businesses comprise “a vital
part of the American economy,” and emphasized the need to “liberalize
sales of restricted securities … to make small offerings more viable.”124
Rule 506 was therefore specifically designed to provide a “less costly
method of raising capital”125 in response to the need for small companies to
raise funds without complying with the oppressive strictures of the various
specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.”). Accredited investors do not trigger such
disclosure obligations because it is assumed “that accredited investors can fend for
themselves without the protections afforded by registration and thereby satisfy the
requirements of proposed Rule 506(b)(1) without a separate subjective determination by
the issuer.” Securities Act Release No. 6339, 1981 WL 31063 at *22.
120
See Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (“Companies must decide what information to
give to accredited investors, so long as it does not violate the antifraud prohibitions of the
federal securities laws. But companies must give non-accredited investors disclosure
documents that are generally the same as those used in registered offerings. If a company
provides information to accredited investors, it must make this information available to
non-accredited investors as well.”)
121
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506
If the issuer sells securities under … Rule 506 to any purchaser that is
not an accredited investor, the issuer shall furnish … at a reasonable
time prior to the sale of securities … [either (i)] The information
required in Article 8 of Regulation S-X (Rule 210.8 of this chapter),
except that only the issuer’s balance sheet, which shall be dated within
120 days of the start of the offering, must be audited[; (ii)] The
financial statement information required in Form S-1 (Rule 239.10 of
this chapter) for smaller reporting companies[; or iii] The financial
statement as would be required in a registration statement filed under
the [Securities Act] on the form that the issuer would be entitled to use.
122
Id.
123
See The Investor’s Advocate, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 30, 2012),
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (“Companies that are privately owned are not
required by law to disclose detailed financial and operating information. They have a wide
latitude in deciding what types of information to make available to the public. They can
shield information from public knowledge and determine for themselves who needs to
know specific types of information.”).
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federal securities laws.126 However, if the capital needs of small businesses
were the only goal, the SEC would not have required disclosures of any
kind. Although certainly less burdensome than registration with the SEC,
the disclosure requirements of Rule 506 remain an imposition upon the
small business issuer. By easing regulatory oversight through Rule 506, the
SEC recognized that it created the potential for companies to take advantage
of certain investors. The SEC’s very existence is premised upon the fact that
a laissez-faire approach to financial market regulation culminated in the
Great Depression.127 Thus, although there is significant evidence that the
promulgation of Rule 506 was driven by the federal government’s desire to
craft an efficient way for small businesses to raise funds,128 the issue of
information asymmetry was also a primary motivation of the SEC. This is
revealed in the Rule 506 deliberations, which cite “access to the same kind
of information that registration would disclose” as a “primary
consideration” for Rule 506.129 In fact, lack of access to information is the
central motivating factor behind virtually all securities laws.130 Thus, it is
not surprising that this issue was of utmost importance to the drafters of
Rule 506. In sum, Rule 506’s precontractual disclosure mechanism meets
two seemingly contradictory goals: (i) easing capital-raising regulations on
124

U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 44th Annual Report of the SEC v, 16 (1978) (covering the
public hearings held by the SEC to determine “the effects of [SEC] rules and regulations on
the ability of small businesses to raise capital”).
125
Securities Act Release No. 6274, 1980 WL 25332 at *6.
126
Rex Hurley & Carla Green, Florida’s Response to the Need for Uniformity in Federal
and State Securities Registration Exemption Requirements, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 313
(1984) (asserting that “[t]he underlying rationale expressed for these exemptions was that
small businesses could not afford the burdensome transactional costs generally associated
with complete registration”).
127
See Seligman, supra note 99, at 2 (noting that the hearings that eventually led to the
enactment of federal securities laws and the establishment of the SEC were designed to
combat the fact that the “majority of the country’s voters had supported the laissez-faire
economic policies” of Calvin Coolidge).
128
Marvin R. Mahney, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121, 166 (1982) (“In 1977, the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure reported to the SEC that its ‘survey of
publicly held companies indicates that the burden of reporting weighs more heavily on
small than large companies.”(citation omitted)).
129
Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1980 on Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act
Release No. 6274,1980 WL 25332 at *4 (Dec. 23, 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
130
See Seligman, supra note 99, at 604 (noting that “[a]t its core, the primary policy of the
federal securities laws today involves the remediation of information asymmetries. This
policy most obviously applies with respect to the mandatory disclosure system, which
compels business corporations and other issuers to disseminate detailed … information
when selling new securities to the public….”).
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small businesses and (ii) protecting the most vulnerable population of
potential investors.
2. The Private Sale of Securities Information Asymmetry Analysis
The justifications for the promulgation of Rule 506 mirror the
Disclosure Framework’s information asymmetry concerns. As noted above,
one of the primary motivating factors supporting the promulgation of Rule
506 was the desire to provide an efficient means of raising capital for small
businesses.131 However, the SEC was only interested in making small
business fundraising more efficient if it could do so without lessening the
protection of the potential investors.132 To maintain such protection, Rule
506 imposes precontractual disclosure requirements to remedy information
asymmetry between the company-issuer and the would-be investor. More
specifically, the SEC drafted Rule 506 to protect those prospective
purchasers of securities who are deemed most susceptible to harm, the nonaccredited investors.133 The disclosures help such person, the nonaccredited investor, through mandatory disclosure of financial information.
By forcing companies to produce salient financial information, the nonaccredited investor is provided all the tools necessary to make an informed
decision. Thus, the point of Rule 506 was to provide an efficient capitalraising device for small businesses that is as fair as possible for nonaccredited investors.134 These financial disclosures are designed to prevent
the information-rich (the issuing company) from taking advantage of the
information-poor (the would-be investor) by requiring the company to lay
bare vital company-specific information.

131

See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1980 on Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act
Release No. 6274, 1980 WL 25332 at *2 (Dec. 23, 1980) (emphasizing that any action that
would “ease the impact of the federal securities laws on small business capital formation”
must be “consistent with the protection of investors”).
133
However, note that unlike other exemptions, Rule 506 requires that “all non-accredited
investors, either alone or with a purchaser representative, must be sophisticated—that is,
they must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to
make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.” Rule
506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm.
134
It should be noted, however, that actual disclosures for sales of securities to nonaccredited investors are rare because such disclosures are costly. See Proposed Revision of
Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 1981
WL 31063 at *12 (Aug. 7, 1981).
132
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The information asymmetry analysis supports the imposition of such
disclosure to achieve equal access to the pertinent information. It should be
self-evident that in the issuer-investor relationship, the issuer does not have
equal access to the company’s financial information. If an investor wanted
to obtain such information, such investor would have to contact the
company and request (and potentially negotiate for) the disclosure of the
information. This expenditure of effort is clearly greater than the effort that
would have to be expended by the issuer, which would amount to no more
than a phone call or email to the company’s accountant. Thus, because the
parties do not enjoy equal access to the information, the information
asymmetry analysis tips in favor of imposing precontractual disclosure.
3. The Private Sale of Securities Stakeholder Analysis
The stakeholder analysis of the Disclosure Framework reveals a strong
interest in imposing precontractual disclosure upon the private sale of
securities. To identify the stakeholders at issue in the Rule 506
precontractual disclosure mandate, one must first look at the contract at
issue. The contract is the sale of private securities and the parties to the
contract are therefore the company desiring to issue such securities and the
potential purchasers of such securities. The party with a strong interest in
imposing precontractual disclosure is the potential investor. One might be
tempted to include the owners of the small businesses, such as shareholders,
because they are directly affected by the transaction. However, while these
parties have an interest in the transaction, they do not have an interest in
imposing precontractual disclosure (because they are the owners of the
entity that will ultimately bear the costs of disclosure). Thus, the only
stakeholder in this transaction for the purposes of the Disclosure
Framework is the would-be investor.
The next step, weighing the respective harms of either disclosure or
nondisclosure, reveals a strong interest in favor of mandating disclosure. If
precontractual disclosure were not required in this transaction, nonaccredited investors would not receive the direct benefit of the regulation
(the disclosure of financial statements) and would be forced to make the
investment decision in the absence of full information. In other words, the
potential harm is that the non-accredited investor, an individual whose net
worth cannot sustain a complete loss of the investment, would enter into an
uninformed investment decision. This is contrary to both notions of innate
fairness and freedom of contract principles. Alternatively, if the disclosure
requirements of Rule 506 are imposed, all non-accredited investors receive
certain financial information of the issuing company and are therefore given
the opportunity to make an informed decision regarding the investment. The
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harm to the company-issuer is the cost of disclosing financial information.
This cost is not insignificant, but pales in comparison to the potential harm
to non-accredited investors. Thus, the harms suffered by the disclosing
party are outweighed by the potential harm to the stakeholder group, the
non-accredited investors.
C. A Statutory-Common Law Hybrid Exception to the General Rule
American jurisprudence has imposed a duty of precontractual disclosure
through both court decisions and promulgation of statutes. These
mechanisms are not, however, mutually exclusive; and legislators do not
hesitate to act in areas in which courts have spoken. This possibility is
illustrated in the following discussion, which analyzes the precontractual
disclosure mechanism for residential real estate transactions. This
precontractual disclosure requirement was initially established in court
decisions, with subsequent decisions imposing escalating duties upon sellers
of residential real estate. In the midst of this, state legislatures enacted
statutes to codify the ever-increasing pro-consumer decisions. This is
therefore an example of where the Disclosure Framework might have
provided a helpful mechanism for the legislature to take into account all
relevant stakeholder interests before imposing precontractual disclosure.
1. Precontractual Disclosure in Private Home Sales
In many states, before a seller may convey non-commercial real estate
to a buyer, the seller must disclose material information about such
property.135 This information must be provided prior to the sale, and the
potential buyer can either back out of the purchase or negotiate a different
price. The first of these statutes was enacted in California, which provided
the model for many of the states that followed.136
135

ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.010-.200 (1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102-1102.15 (West 1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2570-2578 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 508D-1 to -20 (1994);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-2501 to 2512 (1994); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1-99 (West
1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2-1 to .-13 (LexisNexis 1995); IOWA CODE r.558A.1-.8
(1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (LexisNexis 1994); MD. CODE ANN., Real Prop. §
10-702 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 565.951-.966 (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1501 to -523 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-c
(1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 831839 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.465-.490 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.8-1 to -11
(1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-4-37 to -44 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-201 to 210 (1995); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-517 to -525
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.06.005-.900 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 709.01.08 (West 1994).
136
Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44
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California enacted two statutes to require disclosures prior the transfer
of residential property: (i) California Civil Code § 1102.1 (the “Disclosures
Upon Transfer of Residential Property”)137 and (ii) California Civil Code §
2079 (the “Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residential Property”)138
(together, the “California Statutes”). The California Statutes require any
seller or broker of residential real property139 to provide certain disclosures
prior to consummating any sales contract.140 The required disclosures are
detailed in a Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement, and include
representations as to the existence and operation of appliances; 141 the
existence of harmful materials, including asbestos, radon gas, and lead
paint;142 flooding, drainage, or grading problems;143 and even whether the
home suffers from “[n]eighborhood noise problems or other nuisances.”144
The required disclosures in the Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement
were an attempt to identify the material facts that a reasonable buyer would
want to know before entering into a contract. By requiring delivery of the
disclosures before execution of a contract,145 the California Statutes provide
the potential purchaser the opportunity to consider material facts about the
property prior to entering into the contract.146 In other words, this is an
example of a statute imposing precontractual disclosure upon a private
transaction.
2. Motivation for the California Statutes
The California Statutes were enacted in direct response to an evolving
common law that imposed an expanding duty upon sellers and brokers of
residential real estate.147 Decisions across the country reflected the
DEPAUL L.R. 381, 410 (1995).
137
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.1-1102.15 (West Supp. 1994).
138
Id. at §§ 2079-2079.10.
139
“Residential Real Property” is defined as more than one, but fewer than four, dwelling
units. Id. at § 2079.
140
Id. at § 1102.1-1102.15
141
Id. at § 1102.6
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at §1102.3(b).
146
If the seller provides the disclosures after execution of a sales agreement (including any
material amendment to any disclosure given), the purchaser “shall have three days after
delivery in person or five days after delivery by deposit in the mail, to terminate his or her
offer by delivery of a written notice of termination….” See CAL. CIV. CODE §1102.3(b).
147
Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers
Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 693 (1992) (noting that “[i]n direct response to
the Easton decision, the California Legislature enacted two statutes in 1985 which defined

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118216

34

MANDATING PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE

[31-Aug-12

judiciary’s desire to effectively flip the duty to investigate real property
from the buyer to the seller,148 and in many states, “the common law
provide[d] … causes of action for … fraudulent nondisclosure of material
defects.”149 The California Statutes were not intended to serve as “a
replacement of the common law,”150 but were rather an attempt to simplify
the expanding common law disclosure requirements.151 These requirements,
which outlined the duties of residential real property sellers and brokers,
were laid out and justified in Easton v. Strassburger.152
In Easton, the California Court of Appeals imposed a duty upon real
estate brokers to investigate and disclose material facts concerning
residential real property to potential buyers.153 Prior to this decision,
common law imposed upon a broker a duty to disclose known defects.154
Easton, however, went further to impose a duty to disclose all material
defects, whether known or unknown.155 This includes the duty “to conduct a
reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property …
and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the
value or desirability of the property.”156 This duty to inspect, the court
noted, was implicit in precedent.157 More specifically, the court held that
prior case law “speaks not only to facts known by the [broker], but also and
independently to facts that are accessible only to [the broker].”158
Because Easton imposed new duties upon real estate brokers, this
decision predictably inspired a concerted effort by California’s broker
community to limit potential liability.159 This effort spurred the state
legislature to enact the California Statutes to rein in the evolving common

the legal duty owed by a broker to a buyer and specified the types of disclosure that must
be made to prospective purchasers”); see Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate
Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L.R. 381, 410 (1995).
148
Regardless of state statute protection, the buyer has an incentive to investigate the
property because “a purchaser who has completed an inspection is in a better position to
establish the elements of reasonable reliance and causation.” See id. at 405.
149
Id. at 404.
150
See CA B. An., S.B. 1377 Sen. (May 10, 1994) (noting that “the form disclosure was
intended to assist sellers and realtors to comply with their duty of disclosure)”
151
Id.
152
199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
153
Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
154
Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 387-88 (1995).
155
Id. at 408.
156
Id.
157
Cooper v. Jeyve, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
158
Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (citing Cooper, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 724).
159
Id. at 409.
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law (thereby limiting the liability and duties of brokers).160
3. The California Statutes and the Disclosure Framework
The precontractual disclosure obligation imposed by the California
Statutes is in harmony with the Disclosure Framework. However, the first
step of the Disclosure Framework, measuring information asymmetry, is
barely satisfied. Absent the requirement of precontractual disclosure,
homebuyers would be forced to conduct a detailed investigation of the
potential home. The imposition of precontractual disclosure places the
burden of identifying and communicating material facts concerning the
property upon the seller or the broker (i.e., party that has the best access to
such facts). Given the imbalance of access to the house, if both parties were
to expend identical effort into investigating the house, the sellers and
brokers enjoy a slight advantage over the buyers. There is therefore
information asymmetry in this relationship, but it is not great.
The second step of the Disclosure Framework, the stakeholder analysis,
reveals that the only stakeholder in this transaction is the potential buyers of
residential real estate. This is because the only interest that matters for the
stakeholder analysis is the interest in imposing precontractual disclosure.
Neither sellers nor brokers have any interest in imposing precontractual
disclosure, because precontractual disclosure would increase the burden of
these parties. Initially, it might appear that the costs saved by the
stakeholder group (the buyers) in imposing precontractual disclosure are
virtually identical to the costs expended by the sellers or brokers, because
either party would be forced to inspect the home. However, because a real
estate broker will show a particular house to several prospective customers,
and because a prospective buyer will likely view several different houses,
the costs are much greater for the buyers over the course of the home
buying experience. That is, absent the precontractual disclosure obligation,
each potential home buyer would be required to engage in a detailed
investigation of each home such buyer considers. Assuming there is more
than one interested buyer, this results in numerous investigations of the
same house. With the obligation placed upon the broker or seller, only one
investigation per house is required, and the results of such investigation
may be given to each interested potential buyer. This greatly increases the
efficiency of the transaction and reduces the potential costs to the
stakeholders, the potential home buyers.

160

See Washburn, supra note 154.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
As illustrated by Section III, examples in which courts and legislators
have deviated from the general rule against precontractual disclosure are in
harmony with the Disclosure Framework. Thus, the Disclosure Framework
enjoys both theoretical support (from the perspective of freedom of contract
principles) and historical support. To illustrate the application of the
Disclosure Framework in a prospective manner, this section will apply the
analysis to the hypothetical student’s conundrum described at the article’s
outset. This analysis will reveal that the student loan fact pattern satisfies
both factors of the Disclosure Analysis. Through illustration of the
application, this section will demonstrate how the Disclosure Framework
operates to identify an appropriate imposition of precontractual disclosure
while maintaining and supporting freedom of contract principles.
A. The Student Loan Problem
We can now turn to the hypothetical described at this article’s outset. To
summarize, a prospective student is trying to determine the financial
implications of choosing one school over another. One of the schools
provided a financial aid letter which outlined estimated expenses, the
amount most students borrow to attend the school, the loan default rate of
graduates, and an estimated monthly payment. Unfortunately, the other
school did not provide a similar letter, and the student is left to compare
financial aid packages without complete information
1. “[W]hen I graduate, I’m going to owe like $900 a month. No one told
me that.”161
This contractual relationship has become quite pressing of late. The total
amount of student loan debt, $904 billion as of the first quarter of 2012,162
has eclipsed revolving debt163 and continues to grow at an annual rate of
13.9 percent.164 The size of these numbers becomes even more troubling
when one considers the high delinquency rate of student loans.165 The sheer
161

Andrew Martin & Andrew Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by the Soaring Cost of
College, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012).
162
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT
AND CREDIT (May 2012) [hereinafter REPORT].
163
Kelly D. Edmiston, Lara Brooks & Steven Shepelwich, Student Loans: Overview and
Issues, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY COMMUNITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
12 (August 2012).
164
See REPORT, supra note 162.
165
See Edmiston et al., supra note 163, at 4 (noting that “[d]elinquencies are very high
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magnitude of student loan defaults on private loans, as much as $8.1 billion,
is startling.166 Defaults and delinquencies carry a threat of potentially
devastating consequences for the borrower.
If a loan goes into default, the entire unpaid amount of the
loan immediately becomes due. Defaulted borrowers may be
sued, tax refunds may be intercepted, and/or wages may be
garnished. The defaulted borrower is responsible for paying
collection fees, costs, court costs, and attorney fees.
Defaulted borrowers can be denied a professional license.
Eligibility for future loan deferments is withdrawn, as well as
eligibility for other federal student aid under federal benefit
programs. Finally, student loan delinquencies are reported to
the major credit bureaus.167
Not surprisingly, this reality affects a borrower’s spending, both because of
the lack of discretionary funds and the lack of access to other credit (due to
lower credit ratings).168 In addition to these financial pressures, the burden
of carrying this debt has a psychological toll on both students and
parents.169
Beyond the impact on individuals, the issue of rising student loan debt is
one which might have a broader economic impact. Although most
economists believe that a collapse of the student loan system would not
have “the same devastating impact as the mortgage crash” (despite the fact
that the student loan system is “larger than credit card and other consumer
debt”),170 experts note that the “dark cloud” of student debt hinders
economic recovery.171
All of these issues might be more palatable if the students were entering
into the student loan contracts in an informed manner. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. First, student loan applications and award letters are both
“complicated” and “difficult to compare.”172 Financial aid award letters
“vary greatly in both content and presentation” and any tools for students to
assess the potential impact of a student loan are “complex and often

compared to delinquencies on many other forms of debt … impair[ing] the credit of a
substantial share of borrowers and prevent[ing] them from accessing other forms of student
aid”).
166
See Press Release, supra note 3.
167
See Edmiston et al., supra note 163, at 12.
168
Id. at 7.
169
Id. at 13 (noting the “overlooked aspect of individual student debt” of “the
psychological burden” carried by delinquent borrowers).
170
Martin & Lehren, supra note 161.
171
Id.
172
See Edmiston et al., supra note 163, at 12.
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difficult to locate.”173
Perhaps most upsetting is the fact that many students turn to private
loans before exhausting all available federal loans.174 Federal loans often
carry lower interest rates and more flexible payment options, but according
to a 2008 study, “students and parents often do not know the difference
between federal and private loans.”175Assuming rational economic action on
the part of students, were the students to realize that federal loans were
available, they would not resort to the higher interest rates offered by
private loans and credit cards.176
2. The Shopping Sheet: A Potential Solution
Despite the size and reach of the student loan problem, it is not a
completely intractable predicament. In fact, a partnership between the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and the Department of
Education has created a letter which provides the information described in
the hypothetical. This letter, otherwise known as the “Shopping Sheet,” not
only contains information such as the average cost of attending the
particular school, the school’s graduation and retention rate, and the
percentage of students who default on their federal loans, but also provides
some perspective for such information.177 For example, a school’s loan
default rate is characterized as low, medium, or high.178 Thus, a default rate
of 6.2% is not merely reported, it is put into context, and the student knows
that a 6.2% default rate is about average. The graduation rate and the
retention rate of the school is compared to other schools in a similar
173

Id.
Martin & Lehren, supra note 161; see also Edmiston et al., supra note 163, at 12
(“Anecdotal reports” showing that “some students take on private loans while still eligible
for subsidized federal loans.” Private loans “are not guaranteed by the federal government
or otherwise subsidized.”).
175
Jenson, Carol A., Private Loan Counseling for Undergraduate Students: The Role of
College Financial Aid Counselors (2008) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Nebraska).
176
In addition to the evidence of financial harm suffered by students, there is circumstantial
evidence of a strong public policy interest in the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
required the CFPB to submit a report on private student loans. Dodd-Frank Act § 1077(a).
This mandate required the CFPB to examine, among other issues, “the consumer
protections available to private education loan borrowers, including the effectiveness of
existing disclosures and requirements and borrowers’ awareness and understanding about
terms and conditions of various financial products. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1077(b).
177
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/static/students/disclosure.pdf, (providing an example of
the Shopping Sheet for a fictitious student considering a fictitious school).
178
Id.
174
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fashion.179 Thus, the school’s data are not merely conveyed, but are
communicated in a meaningful and comprehensible manner.
Unfortunately, schools are not required to provide the Shopping
Sheet.180 Legislators could ameliorate both the problem presented in the
hypothetical and the problem of rising student debt generally by making the
Shopping Sheet mandatory for all colleges and universities. In fact,
Congress is currently considering taking this step. On May 24, 2012,
Senators Al Franken, Tom Harkin, and Chuck Grassley introduced the
“Understanding the True Costs of College Act,” which would require all
colleges and universities to use a disclosure letter similar to the Shopping
Sheet.181 Given that Congress is currently considering whether or not it is
appropriate to impose disclosure in this relationship, this fact pattern is a
perfect opportunity to analyze the proposed disclosure requirement in light
of the Disclosure Framework.
B. The Disclosure Framework
1. The Student Loan Information Asymmetry Analysis
Although some information provided on the Shopping Sheet is available
to our hypothetical student through other means, much of the information is
in the sole possession of the schools. Such information includes the median
borrowing rate and the loan default rate. This data is virtually unobtainable
without the school’s cooperation because, in order to determine this
information, one would have to identify all former students of the school
that undertook student loans and contact each former student to collect the
necessary data. Even if a list of former students were public, the endeavor
would prove terribly time-consuming and inefficient.
Perhaps the most poignant evidence of information asymmetry concerns
the fact that students are forced to obtain all relevant information from the
school. According to the results of a CFPB collection of public comments,
students expressed difficulty in obtaining “reliable information” regarding
private student loans.182 Most student respondents reported that they were
“dependent on the school’s financial aid office for information on student
loans,” and many respondents “believed that the quality of information they
179

Id.
Schools are only required to provide a Shopping Sheet to veterans. See Exec. Order
No.13,607 (April 27, 2012),. To date, ten schools have pledged to use the Shopping Sheet
for non-veteran applicants. See Press Release, supra note 3.
181
Press Release, Senator Al Franken, Sen. Franken Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Help
Families and Students Understand the True Cost of College (May 24, 2012),
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2093.
182
PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 70, July 20, 2012.
180
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received was inadequate.”183 The fact that the students are dependent upon
the schools to provide the information is evidence that there is an
accessibility problem.184
Further, even when a student has some information, regardless of its
veracity, it is presented in a confusing manner. As noted by the CFPB,
“[t]oo often students receive financial aid award letters that are laden with
jargon, use inconsistent terms and calculations, and make it unnecessarily
difficult to compare different financial aid awards side-by-side.”185
Ultimately, the result is that students enter into contracts which they do not
understand.186 This problem is reflected in the Dodd-Frank Act, which
specifically asked the CFPB to examine whether students “have access to
information sufficient to provide them with assurances that private
education loans are provided in accord with the Nation’s fair lending laws
and that allows public officials to determine lender compliance with fair
lending laws.”187
Given these facts, it may be clear that the parties do not enjoy equal
access to the information at hand without engaging in the information
asymmetry analysis. However, the analysis also clearly shows a high level
of information asymmetry. As a reminder, the information asymmetry
analysis asks whether the parties would have an equal probability of
discovering the facts if they expended the same amount of energy. If the
answer is no, then there is information asymmetry great enough to continue
to the second step of the Disclosure Framework. With respect to the
student’s effort to be expended, the effort is greatly increased by the fact
that information is difficult or impossible to come by, and that any
information received is presented in complicated or misleading fashion. In
183

Id.
A recent district court decision emphasizes the problem of relying upon facts provided
by the school. Although the case involved graduate students, the information asymmetry is
virtually identical to the undergraduate hypothetical. In this case, the plaintiffs, recent
graduates of the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, sued the law school on the grounds that
Colley provided misleading information regarding the percentage of Cooley graduates
employed and the average starting salary for Colley graduates. The court, despite noting
that Cooley’s proffered statistics were “inconsistent, confusing, and inherently
untrustworthy,” held that “an ordinarily prudent person would not have relied” upon such
statistics. The court chastised the plaintiffs for believing the statistics, and noted that the
plaintiffs “should have approached their decision to enter law school with extreme caution
given the size of the investment.” Thus, the court suggested that statistics provided by a
school should be viewed as suspect. Macdonald et. al. v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No.
1:11-CV-831 2012, WL 2994107 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012).
185
See Press Release, supra note 3.
186
Id. (noting that the CFPB has “heard from thousands of student loan borrowers who say
that they simply do not understand what they signed up for”).
187
Dodd-Frank Act § 1077(a).
184
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comparison, the school’s effort necessary to discover the facts to be
disclosed is not insignificant (the costs of maintaining the data), but it is
significantly less than the required effort of the student. In the very least, the
school does not rely upon another party to either produce a list of former
students or determine such students’ contact information. In sum, the
information asymmetry in the contractual relationship between prospective
students and student loan lenders (acting through the schools) is sufficient
to satisfy the first factor of the Disclosure Framework.
2. The Student Loan Stakeholder Analysis
Having established that the information asymmetry in this relationship
satisfies the first step, the next step in the Disclosure Framework is
identifying the stakeholders and weighing the relevant harms. First, one
must identify the stakeholders, or the parties that are directly affected by the
transaction who have an interest in imposing precontractual disclosure. The
most obvious stakeholder is the potential party to the student loan contract:
the student. However, this does not represent the entire universe of
stakeholders, as in many cases, parents of students are directly affected by
either co-signing on their child’s student loans or taking out loans to support
their child’s education.188
Once the stakeholders group is identified, the next step is to consider the
stakeholder group’s interest in imposing precontractual disclosure. If
precontractual disclosure is mandated–if, in other words, the Shopping
Sheet is made mandatory for all schools–the clear beneficiaries would be
students and parents. Students and parents would benefit by having the
opportunity to make informed decisions concerning the amount and type of
loans accepted. The parties harmed by mandated disclosure include the
would-be private student loan lenders, as they will likely see a decrease of
overall student loans. This is not only due to students opting not to attend
schools they cannot afford, but also because more students would
presumably opt for less-expensive federal student loans. The harm suffered
by private lenders if precontractual disclosure were mandated (lowering the
total potential loan pool) is significantly outweighed by the harms currently
suffered by the other stakeholders (entering into ill-formed loan agreements
and taking on excessive amounts of debt).
Further, there is a viable argument that the private lenders would reap
188

Gail Marks-Jarvis, Parents’ Student Loan Debt, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 30,
2012); see also Edmiston, supra note 163, at 3 (describing the PLUS Loans program, in
which loans “are made to parents of … students who have reached borrowing limits for
Stafford loans,” and noting that “[b]ecause of the limited credit histories of most students,
co-signers are often required”).
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some benefit from mandated precontractual disclosure. Private lenders are
currently facing over $8 billion of student loan defaults, representing over
850,000 separate loans.189 This default rate is significant. If one were to
combine this default rate with the fact that a significant portion of private
student loan borrowers graduate without a job (and that those who are
employed have jobs that do not pay enough to make loan payments),190 then
there is reason to think that mandated precontractual disclosure would not
harm private student lenders as much as the previous paragraph suggests.
To be sure, there is a possibility of a lower total number of student loans
issued, but this loss may be mitigated by a presumed reduction in the
number of defaults. Regardless, the harm suffered by private lenders in
mandating precontractual disclosure (lowering the total potential loan pool)
is significantly outweighed by the harms currently suffered by the
stakeholder group (entering into ill-formed loan agreements and taking on
excessive amounts of debt).
CONCLUSION
Information asymmetry is virtually ever-present. In many cases, the use
of information asymmetry to one’s advantage is an inevitable symptom of a
free market. But in some instances, information asymmetry is so great that
it frustrates an individual’s ability to privately order his or her contractual
arrangements. Once information asymmetry rises to this level, the principles
of a free market are endangered and it is appropriate to consider actions to
lessen information asymmetry. Such actions are appropriate if the harm of
nondisclosure outweighs the harm of disclosure. This is, in a nutshell, the
Disclosure Framework.
A lawmaker’s use of the Disclosure Framework will properly identify
transactions in which mandating precontractual disclosure is appropriate.
However, the Disclosure Framework’s application need not be limited to
use by legislators. Because the Disclosure Framework identifies instances in
which mandating precontractual disclosure is both historically consistent
and theoretically justified, the analysis may also provide a convincing
argument for consumer protection groups to urge lawmakers to act. For
example, if a student rights group wished to convince Congress to make the
Shopping Sheet mandatory, the Disclosure Framework may provide a
convincing argument that the Shopping Sheet’s required disclosure is not
189

See PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 182, at 5.
See Id. at 70 (“In 2009, the unemployment rate for private student loan borrowers who
started school in the 2003-2004 academic year was 16%. Ten percent of recent graduates of
four-year colleges have monthly payments of all education loans in excess of 25% of their
income.”).
190
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only necessary, but appropriate for legislative action.
***
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